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POINT I
THE RELEASE OF A CO-GUARANTOR DOES NOT RELEASE THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR
WHERE SUCH RELEASE OF THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF
NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHERE SUCH RELEASE WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED
OR INTENDED, AND WHERE THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS.
In Defendant-Respondent's portion of his Brief entitled "Disposition
in Lower Court" the statement is made that the "..•undisputed facts
show that the Plaintiff-Appellant had accepted a compromise sum as
full and complete payment of principal debt," and similar references
to so called "undisputed facts" appear throughout Defendant-Respondent's
Brief.

See Defendant-Respondent's Brief, p. 1.

It is not an un-

disputed fact that the Plaintiff-Appellant intended to or did in
fact accept a compromise sum as full and complete payment of the
debt of the principal obligor, Barnes Heating and Electric Company.
That this is true is illustrated by the following excerpt from the
Deposition of Mr. A. Ray Curtis:
Q.

(By Mr. Cutler)

As I understand it, you may have had some

conversations with Glen about liquidating this indebtedness
that you now don't presently recall?
A.

We had asked if there was a way that we could work it out,

because I was over asking him for money of [sic] the time.
Q.

What was his response?

A.

He just didn't have any money for us.

Q.

Then you personally contacted Hugh Barnes, is that right?

A.

Yes.
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•

Q.

And it was your intention to satisfy and release this

corporate obligation, is that also correct?
A.

I think we should make that very clear.

In my discussions

with Hugh Barnes, the agreement that we entered into was to release his portion of the personal obligation.
Q.

What did you say to Hugh, and what did he say to you?

A.

I said, "Hugh, if you will give me three thousand dollars

this will satisfy your portion of the obligation."
A. Ray Curtis Deposition, pp. 18-19.

(Emphasis Supplied).

This question was further probed and reiterated by DefendantRespondent's Counsel since he viewed Mr. A. Ray Curtis as an adverse
witness.

A. Ray Curtis Deposition, p. 11, Line 8.

This is shown by

the following representative selection of various attempts by PlaintiffRespondent' s Counsel to elicit further information from Mr. A. Ray
Curtis:
Q.

And you read that [i.e., the restrictive endorsement]

before you negotiated it?

You read the endorsement?

A.

At that time, yes.

Q.

So, at that time, that also was included within your

contemplation, was it not; that the corporation would also be
released?
A.

Absolutely not, but we had $3,000.

We needed to get in

the bank, and so we accepted this, . . . ."
•
Q.

Id.

FURTHER EXAMINATION

Isn't it correct, Mr. Curtis, that you accepted that check

with the full understanding that the corporation was also going
to be released from payment?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

No, it was not.

In no way, nor has it ever been that

accept Hugh Barneses obligation.

Now in the previous Deposition,

this was thoroughly covered.
A. Ray Curtis Deposition, p. 20.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
Q.

And even by your testimony today, you are acknowledging

that you at least anticipated releasing Hugh Barnes from his
indebtedness?
A,

Definitely, Hugh Barnes only.

p. 21.

A. Ray Curtis Deposition,

(Emphasis Supplied).
FURTHER EXAMINATION

Q.

In point of fact, Mr. Curtis, isn't it correct that you

actually knew and understood that you were discharging the
Barnes Heating and Electric Company, and that's why you told
your attorneys not to sue?
A.

Absolutely not.

Our books have never been closed on

Barnes Heating and Electric Company, only on Hugh Barneses
obligation as he signed the guarantee.

Id.., at 23.

(Emphasis

Supplied).
This point was reiterated upon examination by Appellant's Counsel:
Q.

When you were discussing this with Hugh, did he ever tell

you if Glen was to reimburse him for any of that $3,000?
A.

No.

Q.

Did he ever tell you that Glen was going to be responsible

for the remainder of the indebtedness?
A.

No, but I told him.

Id.., at 25-26.
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Furthermore, that the Plaintiff-Appellant at no time intended to
release the principal obligor, Barnes Heating and Electric Company,
or the guarantor, GLEN BARNES, is evidenced by the repeated collection
attempts conducted by the Plaintiff-Appellant immediately after
the receipt of the check with its restrictive endorsement from the
Defendant-Respondent's father, Hugh Barnes.

Within a period of a

mere four (4) days following the receipt of the check from Hugh
Barnes, the President of the Appellant-Plaintiff had instructed his
attorney to communicate with GLEN BARNES to attempt further collection
on the outstanding indebtedness.

The check issued by Hugh Barnes

was dated March 27, 1974 and a collection letter from the PlaintiffAppellant's Counsel, dated April 1, 1974, was sent to DefendantRespondent, GLEN BARNES.

This point has also been acknowledged by

Defendant-Respondent's Counsel in the deposition of Mr. A. Ray
Curtis.
Q.

Did you have any discussions with Glen concerning this

check for which you considered it to be a limited release?
A,

I don't remember.

Q.

Subsequently you, either personally or through your agents,

made demands to Glen Barnes for additional payment; did you
not?
A.

That's right.

Q.

When that wasn't forthcoming, you personally contacted

attorneys to represent you in collecting that sum?
A.

That's right.

Id., at 21-22.
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It is also clear from the Deposition of Mr. A. Ray Curtis, the
President of Plaintiff-Appellant, that multiple attempts at collection
from Barnes Heating and Electric Company or, in the alternative,
GLEN BARNES, were made.
Q.

Did you ever try collecting from the corporation, itself,

by asking Glen or Hugh to pay the remaining indebtedness?
A.

We had been told by Glen that there was just no money.

We

made repeated requests for the money.
Q.

Approximately how many, a dozen, half-a-dozen, to the best

of your knowledge?
A.

It's hard to remember precisely, but eight or ten times,

at least.

Id., at 27.

That Hugh Barnes only was released from his obligation under
the personal guarantee agreement is evidenced by the fact that the
three thousand dollars payment came from the separate funds of Hugh
Barnes in the form of a check drawn on his personal checking account.
Also, Mr. A. Ray Curtis, the President of Plaintiff-Appellant, had
dealt only with Hugh Barnes and intended only to release Hugh Barnes
from his portion of the obligation under the Personal Guarantee
Agreement.

See A. Ray Curtis Deposition, pp. 13 and 23.

That the principal obligor, Barnes Heating and Electric Company,
was not released by the Plaintiff-Appellantfs attempt to release Mr.
Hugh Barnes is thoroughly consistent with the facts in the case
which show that GLEN BARNES was the principal manager of Barnes
Heating and Electric Company and that various attempts at collection
of the debt owing to Plaintiff-Appellant were directed at the said
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GLEN BARNES and Barnes Heating and Electric Company.

Note the

following excerpt from the Deposition of Mr. A. Ray Curtis conducted
by Defendant-Respondent's Counsel:
Q.

So, in 1969, you correct me if I am wrong, I am just

trying to understand all of what you are saying.

As far as you

knew, that company was owned by Mr. Hugh Barnes, and to some
degree of involvement, Glen Barnes; is that correct?
A.

It was owned by the two of them principally.

The two of

them would be the principal Shareholders.
Q.

How much did Glen own, to your knowledge?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

But he was at this time a, as you said—what were your

words?

Active or prominent in the company this time?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Is that one of the reasons you required his [i.e., Glen Barnes'

signature?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was Hugh Barnes at this time starting to recede from

activity in the company?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So, in 1969, it was your understanding that Glen was the

principal of the company?
A. < So far as management was concerned, yes. Shareholders,
I'm not sure.
Q.

I don't know.

You assumed that he had a strong interest in the company

sufficient to require his signature on this guarantee, then?
A.

You bet.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Furthermore, Mr. Curtis had delivered the personal guarantee form to
Glen Barnes, the Defendant-Respondent.
12.

See A. Ray Curtis Deposition, p.

Most significantly, the facts clearly indicate that in initially

requiring the personal guarantee negotiations were primarily had
between A. Ray Curtis, Inc., and GLEN BARNES.
Q.

Who asked, or who contacted you about more credit?

A.

There was no request.

They had simply reached the. end of

their rope, and we initiated the form, and we said we've got to
have this.

We had repeatedly asked for money that didn't come

forth.
Q.

When you say "We", was that you personally?

A.

Our company.

Q.

Did you contact—

A.

It could be others in the company as well.

Q.

Who did you personally contact about it?

A.

Glen Barnes.

Q.

Were your dealings primarily with Glen or with Hugh?

A.

Primarily.

Q.

With whom?

A.

With Glen.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

Well, because the father was rarely there.

Yes, me personally.

Glen was in

the position of management of the business, and he's the man
that made the payments and ordered the equipment, and so on.
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FURTHER EXAMINATION
Q.

So far as you know it was Glen, who was pretty well running

the operation of the company?
A.

Yes.
A. Ray Curtis Deposition, pp. 12-13.

The foregoing quotations indicate that it was GLEN BARNES, and
not his father, Hugh Barnes, that was in the active control and
management of the business of Barnes Heating and Electric Company*
Because of poor health and for other reasons, Hugh Barnes, was
receding from active participation in the management of the company
and was more actively involved in installation work.

See A. Ray

Curtis Deposition, p. 14.
Defendant-Respondent's argument that the principal obligor,
Barnes Heating and Electric Company, was released by virtue of
Plaintiff-Appellantfs attempted release of Hugh Barnes in exchange
for his partial payment of the total indebtedness of the principal
obligor, would be stronger if negotiations had been conducted between
GLEN BARNES and the Plaintiff-Appellant and if the partial payment
had been received from GLEN BARNES, the party who was the principal
manager of the business of Barnes Heating and Electric Company and
the party with whom the personal guarantee had been originally
negotiated.

However, this was not the case.

The only negotiations

which ever took place were had with Hugh Barnes in his individual
capacity as a co-guarntor of the obligation of Barnes Heating and
Electric Company.

In fact, GLEN BARNES, at no time, participated in

the negotiations between Hugh Barnes and A. Ray Curtis Company.
Hugh Barnes Deposition, p. 30. Also, Hugh Barnes at no time
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See

indicated to Mr. A. Ray Curtis that he intended that his son, GLEN
BARNES, should also be released by virtue of his partial payment on
the personal guarantee agreement, See Hugh Barnes1 Deposition, p. 2 9,
and, significantly, at the time that negotiations were had with Mr.
A. Ray Curtis, Hugh Barnes never discussed with his son, GLEN BARNES,
the Defendant-Respondent herein, his supposed release from the
obligation to A. Ray Curtis, Inc.

In fact, a period of two months

elapsed between the time of the original negotiations between Mr.
Hugh Barnes and Mr. A. Ray Curtis and the subsequent issuance of
Hugh Barnes1 personal check in partial satisfaction of his obligation
under the personal guarantee agreement.

The following excerpt from

the Deposition of Hugh Barnes will clearly indicate that the matter
of the release of the Defendant-Respondent, GLEN BARNES, or in the
alternative the principal obligor, Barnes Heating and Electric
Company, was not discussed between Mr. A. Ray Curtis and Hugh Barnes,
but was discussed between Mr. Hugh Barnes and his son, GLEN BARNES,
during the two month period following the negotiations and initial
agreement between Mr. A. Ray Curtis and Mr. Hugh Barnes.
(Examination conducted by Counsel for Defendant-Respondent.)
Q.

Did you discuss with Glen the settlement that you were

negotiating with A. Ray Curtis Company prior to the time you
issued that check; is that correct?
A.

No.

I told him what I had done.

Q.

You told him after?

A.

After, not before the check was made out, but I told him I

would come over to talk to Ray about it.
Q.

To Glen?

A.

To Glen.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

After the check was negotiated;

A.

No.

Q.

After you gave the check to A. Ray Curtis Company;

A.

No.

Q.

Tell me what—

A.

Before I wrote the check out. You see there were almost

two months difference between when we agreed and the time _I
gave Ray the money.
Q.

(Emphasis Supplied.)

So you met with Mr. Curtis and you agreed on this $3,000

figure?
A.

Right.

Q.

And then a period of two months, approximately, elapsed?

A.

That1s right.

Q.

Before you gave him the check?

A.

That1s right.
Hugh Barnes Deposition, p.29.

Defendant-Respondent cannot seriously contend that it should
benefit from negotiations had between father and son after an initial
agreement had been reached between Hugh Barnes and the PlaintiffAppellant.

Especially, is this so where Hugh Barnes, by his own

admission, at no time notified the Plaintiff-Appellant that he
intended for his son GLEN BARNES and/or Barnes Heating and Electric
Company to also be released by virtue of his payment of $3,000.
Q.

Did you ever talk to A. Ray Curtis about wanting Glen

released?
A.

I never talked to Ray about wanting it.

Q.

Was there ever any understanding between you and A. Ray

Curtis with respect to Glen being released?
A.

As Digitized
far as
Glen being released, i/t was never mentioned
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

about Barnes Heating and Electric.
29.

Hugh Barnes Deposition, p.

(Emphasis Supplied).
FURTHER EXAMINATION

Q.

Did Glen take part in any of the negotiations or stages

with A. Ray Curtis Company?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever have any discussions with Glen regarding his

release from the —
A.

No.

Q.

— A . Ray Curtis Company?

A.

No.

Id., at 30.

The following additional excerpt from the Deposition of Hugh
Barnes, conducted by Counsel for the Defendant-Respondent herein,
further and more clearly illustrates that an initial agreement was
reached between Hugh Barnes and Mr. A. Ray Curtis. However, during
the two month period before actual payment of the money to Mr.
Curtis, discussions between the father, Hugh Barnes, and the son,
GLEN BARNES, were had—discussions of which, the Plaintiff-Appellant
was never informed—wherein the father and son apparently concluded
that both should be released by virtue of the release of Hugh Barnes
individually under the Personal Guarantee Agreement.
Q.

So you met with Mr. Curtis and you agreed on this $3,000

figure?
A.

Right.

Q.

And then a period of two months, approximately, elapsed?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Before you gave him the check?

A.

That1s right.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q.

But before you gave him the check, you did discuss it with

Glen?
A.

Yes, everything I was doing.

Q.

And that it would settle the account?

A,

Yes.

Icl., at 32-33.

Clearly, the law should not dignify the ex parte negotiations and
agreements as between this father and son by giving it the status of
an accord and satisfaction or a release where such ex parte and
"silent" negotiations were never communicated to the creditor whose
rights would be substantially and negatively prejudiced by their
independent and uncommunicated agreement.
"No effect will be given to a release procured by a debtor
under a covinous combination ...[with a Co-debtor]... in fraud
of the...[creditor]." 66 Am Jur 2d. "Release" §34, at 713.
These facts eloquently illustrate Plaintiff-Appellant's position
that the restrictive endorsement on the subject check was not the
final intergration of the understanding of the parties and did not
operate to release the co-guarantor, GLEN BARNES.
The Plaintiff-Appellant intended to reach an accord and satisfaction with Hugh Barnes, thereby releasing him from his portion of
the obligation under the personal guarantee agreement; however, as
illustrated,

the Plaintiff-Appellant certainly did not intend to

release Barnes Heating and Electric or the Defendant-Respondent,
GLEN BARNES, and was never notified or informed of the communications
between Hugh Barnes and GLEN BARNES or informed of the supposed
intention of Mr. Hugh Barnes that his small payment of $3,000 would
also release his son, GLEN BARNES, who was still very much active in
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other business concerns and who was able to discharge his ratable
share of the indebtedness under the personal guarantee agreement.
Therefore, the only reading of the restrictive endorsement on the
check consistent with the facts in this case is that suggested by
the Appellant in the Appellant's brief; namely, that the check of
Hugh Barnes represented "payment in full of interest and principal
to A. Ray Curtis Company relieving Hugh Barnes personally from any
further payment on the account of Barnes Heating and Electric Company."
See Appellant's Brief, p. 10.
By suggesting the foregoing interpretation, Plaintiff-Appellant
does not attempt to vary the terms of the writing itself and, therefore,
does no violence to the parol evidence rule. An attempt is made to
clarify, not modify, an endorsement which, in light of the cited circumstances, is ambiguous.
"Some Courts apply the parol evidence rule only in suits
between parties to the release and their privies, and not
where strangers to the release are involved. Thus, parol
evidence may be admitted to show who was intended to be
covered or bound by the release." 66 Am. Jur. 2d., "Release"
§52, at 730-731.
Where it is clear that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not intend to
release GLEN BARNES, where the said GLEN BARNES was not a party to the
negotiations with Appellant's Agent, A. Ray Curtis, and where GLEN
BARNES and his father apparently agreed after such initial negotiation
between the Appellant and the father of the Respondent that both should
be released by the father's partial payment of the indebtedness, and
where such agreement was never communicated in any form to A. Ray Curtis,
Inc., releasing GLEN BARNES from his ratable portion of the obligation
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owing the Plaintiff-Appellant would work an inequitable and unjust
result upon A. Ray Curtis, Inc.
"The modern view is that where two or more obligors are
jointly liable for a breach of contract [here, the Personal
Guarantee Agreement,] a release given to one does not
necessarily release the other, and that the question whether
the other is released depends upon (1) the intention of the
parties to the release instrument, and (2) whether the injured party has in fact received full compensation (satisfaction)." Id., §35, at 713-714. (Emphasis Supplied).
"The scope of a release is determined by the intention of
the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular
instrument, considered in light of all the facts and circumstances." Id. §30, at 706.
The materials herein cited and Plaintiff-Appellant's immediate/
continuing and repeated attempts to effect collection from GLEN BARNES
of the balance of the obligation after receipt of the $3,000 partial
payment by his father unequivocally show that a release of GLEN BARNES
or Barnes Heating and Electric was never intended; nor has A. Ray
Curtis, Inc. received full compensation (satisfaction) for the amount
owed.
Based upon Plaintiff-Appellant's intention to release Hugh Barnes
only, and considering Defendant-Respondent's contention that Hugh
Barnes also intended by such release to benefit his son, GLEN BARNES,
and/or Barnes Heating and Electric Company, it is clear that there was
no meeting of the minds between the parties and/or there was a material
mistake of fact which would justify the Plaintiff-Appellant's avoidance
of the supposed release in favor of Hugh Barnes, Id. , §18, at 693,
possibly the restitution of the consideration received, Id.., §57, at
736-737, cf. Id., §57, at 739, and the institution of new proceedings
against all parties incluidng GLEN BARNES.

Because of the state of
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health of Mr. Hugh Barnes Plaintiff-Appellant would prefer to avoid
such a result.
Nowhere in Defendant-Respondent's Brief is it indicated that
negotiations or discussions were had between GLEN BARNES, the active
manager of Barnes Heating and Electric Company, and Mr. A. Ray
Curtis with reference to the release of Barnes Heating and Electric
Company or the personal release of GLEN BARNES by virtue of the
$3,000 payment by his father, Hugh Barnes.

Nor was the Plaintiff-

Appellant at any time informed of the supposed intention of Mr.
Hugh Barnes that his son, GLEN BARNES, should also be released by
virtue of his partial payment of the total indebtedness owing to A.
Ray Curtis Company.

Consequently, Defendant-Respondent has not

shown the necessary elements for an accord and satisfaction, or, in
the alternative, a release, running to his benefit.

There has been

no showing of a meeting of the minds between GLEN BARNES and A. Ray
Curtis, Inc.

Likewise, although the Defendant-Respondent has shown

some consideration to support Plaintiff-Appellant's desired release
of his father, Hugh Barnes, from his ratable share of the obligation
under the personal guarantee agreement, Defendant-Respondent has not
shown any consideration which would release his personal and continuing
obligation under the Personal Guarantee Agreement.
POINT II
IF APPLICABLE, THE UTAH JOINT OBLIGATIONfS ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
WRITTEN RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AGAINST A CO-OBLIGOR AS A PREREQUISITE
TO PRESERVING LIABILITY AGAINST AN OBLIGOR WHERE A CO-OBLIGOR HAS
BEEN RELEASED.
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that the Respondent
misinterprets the
provisions of the Utah Joint Obligation Act
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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insofar as it is suggested that the Plaintiff-Appeallant had to
preserve and memorialize in writing any rights he may have had
against GLEN BARNES at the time a partial release was negotiated
with his father, Hugh Barnes.

A careful reading of Section 15-4-4,

Utah Code Annotated, clearly shows that a written reservation of
rights against co-obligor, as suggested by the Defendant-Respondent,
is not necessary*
"§15-4-4 Release of Co-obligor - Reservation of Rights.
—
Subject to the provisions of §15-4-3, the Obligee's release or
discharge of one or more of several obligors, or of one or more
of joint or of joint and several obligors, shall not discharge
co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing and as a part
of the same transaction as the release or discharge expressly
reserves his rights; and in the absence of such a reservation
[i.e., a written reservation] of rights shall discharge coobligors only t£ the extent provided in §15-4-5." Id. (Emphasis
Supplied).
That the co-obligor in such a situation is released only tc> the
extent of the payments by the released co-obligor is made apparent
by a careful reading of §15-4-3 and 15-4-5, Utah Code Annotated.
"§15-4-3. Payments by Co-obligor. —
The amount or value of
any consideration received by the obligee from one or more of
several obligors, or from one or more of joint or of joint and
several obligors, in whole or in partial satisfaction of their
obligations shall be credited to the extent of the amount
received on the obligation of all co-obligor, to whom the
obligor or obligors receiving consideration did not stand in
relation of a surety.
§15-4-5. Release of Co-obligor—Effective knowledge of obligee.
— I f an obligee releasing or discharing an obligor without
express reservation of rights against the co-obligor then
known or has a reason to know that the obligor released or
discharged or did not pay as much of the claim as he was bound
by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the
obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be satisfied to
the amount which the obligee knew or had reason to know that
the release or discharge of obligor was bound to such coobligor to pay.
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not
then such knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim
against the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the extent of the
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lesser of two amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the fractional
share of the obligor released or discharged, or (b) the amount
that such obligor was bound by his contract in relation to his
co-obligor to pay.
Clearly, a written reservation of rights is not required, and the
statute provides that GLEN BARNES was released only t<o the extent
of the payment received from his father, Hugh Barnes.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY THE FULL DISCHARGE
OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Plaintiff-Appellant is fully sympathetic with the poor state of
health of Mr. Hugh Barnes and, for that reason, attempted to negotiate
a release only as to Hugh Barnes of his portion of the obligation under
the Personal Guarantee Agreement here in question.

However, Plaintiff-

Appellant at no time intended to release GLEN BARNES, who is in good
health and continues to engage actively in various business interprises,
from his share of the obligation under the Personal Guarantee Agreement
which he signed with full knowledge of the legal implications of
signing such a document.

See Hugh Barnes Deposition, p. 14.

Especially is this so, where the Personal Guarantee Agreement was
delivered in person to GLEN BARNES, the active manager of Barnes
Heating and Electric Company.
1 2 .

(See A. Ray Curtis Deposition, p. 11 &

•

The Plaintiff-Appellant has not induced the detrimental reliance
of the Defendant-Respondent, GLEN BARNES.

Plaintiff-Appellant cannot

be bound by the secret and/or passive agreements between father and
son that the healthy, vigorous, and working son should be released
at the same time that the father is released, because of poor health
and for other reasons.

Defendant-Respondent has not shown that he

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

has detrimentally relied upon any representations by the PlaintiffAppellant; if anything, the Defendant-Respondent has been benefited
enormously by his contention that he was released by virtue of his
father's negotiations with Mr. A. Ray Curtis.

An inquiry into the

detrimental reliance of Hugh Barnes is not warranted since Mr. Hugh
Barnes has not been made a party to this action and since it was
Plaintiff-Appellant's intention to release Hugh Barnes, but only Hugh
Barnes, from his portion of the obligation under the Personal Guarantee
Agreement and not the active, vigorous and healthy son, GLEN BARNES.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff-Appellant cannot be bound by the uncommunicated agreement between Hugh Barnes and GLEN BARNES, which "agreement" first took
place after his initial negotiations with Mr. A. Ray Curtis. PlaintiffAppellant never intended to release GLEN BARNES from his ratable share
of the obligation under the Personal Guarantee Agreement and attempts
at further collection from GLEN BARNES were continued immediately after
receipt of the personal check of Hugh Barnes.
The Defendant-Respondent has failed to show either a meeting of
the minds between himself and A. Ray Curtis, Inc., or consideration
to support his supposed release from his obligation under the Personal
Guarantee Agreement.

Therefore, no release or accord and satisfaction

exists.
The Utah Joint Obligations Act, if applicable, will discharge the
Defendant-Respondent only t<3 the extent of the lesser of (a) the amount
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of the fractional share of the obligor released or discharged, i.e.
the $3,000 paid by Hugh Barnes, or (b) the amount that he was bound
by his relation with Hugh Barnes (his co-obligor) to pay, $4,244.03,
assuming an even division of responsibility on the Personal Guarantee
Agreement.
Respectfully Submitted,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, this 28th day of May, 1976,
to Attorney Roger F. Cutler, attorney for the Defendant-Respondent,
Glen Barnes.
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